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ERRATA 
Case No. 920145 
Rule 29(b)(13) priority 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT the Johnson-Bowles Company, 
Inc., and Marlen V. Johnson's Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
filed on March 20, 1992, contains two minor typographical errors. 
First, p. 28, footnote 16 should read 26 million not 
"2.6 million." The arithmetic would make no sense otherwise. 
Second, Petitioners mistakenly refer to §12(j) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 on pages 7 and 29 of their 
Petition. Section 12(j) governs securities "registered for 
trading" under the Exchange Act and has no bearing on this appeal 
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by analogy or otherwise. Petitioners only meant to refer to 
§12(k) of the Exchange Act on such pages, a full copy of which is 
contained in their separately filed Appendix as Exhibit "16". 
The Court should thus ignore the foregoing references to §12 (j) 
of the Exchange Act. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. 
DATED this 26th day of Mar^h, 199 2 
Ichaer Coombs 
Attorney for Petitioners 
WMMA. 
/ 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the 26th day of 
March, 1992, he mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
ERRATA to: 
Paul Van Dam 
Attorney General 
David N. Sonnenreich 
Assistant Attorney General 
115 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
1000.01A:ERRATA.l 
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Constitutional Issues, 
1. Preemption and the Supremacy Clause. Whether there is a 
conflict between the federal regulatory scheme embodied in the 
NASD Rules of Fair Practice and the Division's own interpretation 
and application of its March 1, 1989, Summary Order such that the 
two cannot stand, the result of which enables the Division to 
subject the Johnsons to diametrically inconsistent regulation. 
In other words, when it was "physically impossible" for the 
Johnsons to honor outstanding brokerage contracts under both the 
federal and state regulatory schemes at the same time, how can 
the Court of Appeals be correct in holding that no conflict 
between state and federal regulation exists? Whether the Court 
of Appeals' amended opinion is consistent with its own decision 
in Western Capital & Securities, Inc. v. Knudsvig, (Utah App. 
1989), 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 65, 67-68, 768 P.2d 989, 992-994, [1989 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 194,337 (recognizing 
that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to interpret and 
enforce NASD rules). 
2. The Commerce Clause. In light of the fact that, after 
March 1, 1989, the date of the Division's Summary Order, 
Johnson-Bowles owed 397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock to 
four out-of-state brokerage firms and one out-of-state clearing 
corporation and could not afford to reimburse them in the event 
any effected a "buy-in" at admitted manipulated prices, and, in 
light of the fact that to dishonor the trades themselves or, 
dishonor any "buy-in," would subject the Johnsons to severe 
disciplinary action by the NASD (even expulsion), including 
several NASD arbitrations, whether Mr. Johnson's conduct in 
merely purchasing — not selling or offering to 
sell — sufficient stock to cover these pre-existing, federal 
executory contracts (and thereby protect the Johnsons' 
fellow-NASD members against hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
losses) is merely incidental to the "local putative benefit" 
derived from seeing the Johnsons dishonor the same 
contracts. How does the "public"'s alleged "interest" in seeing 
that no U.S.A. Medical stock was "offered or sold" to Utah 
residents relate to, let alone outweigh, the interests of at 
least four out-of-state NASD-member broker-dealers and one major 
clearing corporation in receiving the stock to which they were 
contractually entitled? In other words, in comparison to 
Johnson-Bowles' contractual obligations to non-resident third-
parties, what "local putative benefit" is derived from putting 
the Johnsons out of business simply for not breaching such 
federal contracts? Further, how does that "benefit" outweigh the 
interests of Johnson-Bowles' 5,000 customers in seeing it remain 
in business to service their accounts? What Utah resident could 
have possibly cared whether Johnson-Bowles completed the 
outstanding brokerage contracts in issue? 
3. Due Process. How did the Johnsons have notice, 
particularly under the standards in the industry, that Mr. 
Johnson's private purchases would subject them to discipline 
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under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g)? How did the Johnsons have 
notice that their conduct allegedly "frustrated" the "intent, 
scope or purpose" of the Summary Order when the Court of Appeals 
(in order to skirt the issue of whether "private purchases" 
constitute "trading") invents this fiction in its amended 
opinion? Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the 
Division's Summary Order issued under §14(3) was "permanent" and 
therefore operative at the time of Mr. Johnson's purchases, 
especially when specific statutory measures are provided under 
§14(3) to make a Summary Order "permanent"? If a Summary Order 
is "permanent" without so stating, is it an unconstitutional 
restraint on alienation? If a Summary Order entered under §14(3) 
is indeed "permanent," is it Constitutional to delegate authority 
to one government official to summarily and permanently restrain 
the alienation of property? 
Utah Uniform Securities Act Issues. Whether it is reasonable 
and rational — or correct — to conclude that a securities 
broker-dealer and agent engaged in "dishonest or unethical 
practices" under Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g) simply because, in 
order to complete federal executory contracts and otherwise 
comply with the NASD Rules of Fair Practice (which simultaneously 
govern them), Mr. Johnson purchased — and didn't "sell" or 
"offer to sell" — stock subject of a Division order suspending 
the availability of the types of "offers or sales" itemized in 
§61-1-14(2). If such conduct is a "dishonest or unethical 
practice," how is revocation or suspension of the Johnsons' 
brokerage licenses "in the public interest"? In other words, 
when certain purchases made by Mr. Johnson were necessary to 
protect fellow out-of-state NASD-members and satisfy 
Johnson-Bowles1 pre-existing obligations under the federal 
regulatory scheme, what is it that is truly "dishonest or 
unethical" about such conduct, how is it a "practice," and how is 
suspending the Johnsons' brokerage licenses "in the public 
interest"? Precisely how or why did the purchases "frustrate" or 
undermine the "intent, scope or purpose" of the Division's March 
1, 1989, Summary Order suspending all §14(2) exemptions, an order 
which only prohibited certain "offers or sales" to Utah 
residents? Saying it a final way, when the Division's Summary 
Order of March 1, 1989, was designed solely to prevent the 
further distribution of U.S.A. Medical stock to Utah residents, 
what did the Johnsons actually do to undermine that purpose such 
that their conduct is (1) a "dishonest or unethical practice" and 
(2) that the revocation or suspension of their brokerage licenses 
is "in the public interest"? 
REFERENCES TO REPORTS OF OPINIONS 
ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals• amended opinion is: Johnson-Bowles 
Co., Inc. and Marlen Vernon Johnson v. The Division of Securities 
and the Department of Commerce, State of Utah, 181 Utah Adv. Rep. 
11 (Utah App. February 19, 1992), Appendix Exhibit "1" hereto. 
The Court of Appeals1 initial and now withdrawn opinion is found 
at 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah App. November 29, 1991), App. Ex. 
" 2 " . 
GROUNDS ON WHICH JURISDICTION 
OF THE SUPREME COURT IS INVOKED 
The date of entry of the amended decision sought to be 
reviewed is February 19, 1992. This Petition is thus timely 
under Rule 48(a). The statutory provision which confers 
jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to review the amended decision 
is Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(a). 
STATUTES AND RULES THAT THE CASE INVOLVES 
Constitutional Provisions at Issue. 
U.S. Const, art. IV, §1 and §2, mandating comity between 
federal and state government. The Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const, 
art. IV, §2, providing that federal law preempts state 
regulations where there is an actual conflict between the two 
sets of law such that both cannot stand. The Commerce Clause, 
U.S. Const, art. I, §8, providing that Congress shall have the 
power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states." The due process clauses of the 5th and 14th 
Amendments to the federal Constitution. 
Securities Provisions at Issue. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g), effective 1989, provides that 
an agent and broker-dealer's registration with the Utah Division 
of Securities ("Division") may be suspended or revoked if he or 
she "engaged in dishonest or unethical practices in the 
securities business" and the director "finds" that such 
revocation or suspension is "in the public interest." Ex. "10". 
Division Rule R177-6-lg, effective 1989, lists the types of 
conduct which are considered contrary to §6(1)(g) of the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, none of which proscribe the conduct in 
issue. Ex. "11". The Rule acknowledges that it is "patterned" 
after NASD Rules, Rules which ironically require the Johnsons to 
do what they did. 
Sections 1401-1404 of the National Association of Securities 
Administrators Association ("NASAA") Guidelines (CCH) sets forth 
guidelines for state securities regulators relative to "dishonest 
or unethical business practices" in the securities industry. Ex. 
"12". Like Division Rule R177-6-lg, it is "patterned" after 
Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice and similarly makes 
no mention of purchasing stock to cover pre-existing, federal 
executory contracts which cannot be honored in the normal course 
as a result of other persons1 fraud and market manipulation. 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(2), effective 1989, lists the types 
of "offers or sales" of securities which are exempt from 
registration under §61-1-7 and §61-1-15. Ex. "13". 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-14(3), effective 1989, authorizes the 
executive director of the Division to summarily suspend all 
exemptions from registration found in §61-1-14(1) and (2). Ex. 
"13". 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-7 provides that only "offers or sales" 
must be registered under the Utah Uniform Securities Act, not 
purchases. This ties in directly with §14(2) which exempts 
certain, specified "offers or sales" from the registration 
provisions of §7. 
Utah Code Arm. §61-1-26(3) contains the jurisdictional 
provisions. Under the 1989 law, a transaction with a non-Utah 
resident did not come under the Act. Ex. "15". Effective April 
23, 1990, the legislature amended §26(3) consistent with the 
Uniform Act to make the Act apply to transactions with out-of-
state residents. 
Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, NASD Manual 
(CCH) 12151 at p. 2013-3 and 13501, et seg. (May 1989), provides: 
"A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high 
standards of commercial honor and just and equitable principles 
of trade." 
Section 12(j) and (k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
provides that summary orders thereunder may only issue for 10 
days. Ex. I,16M. 
Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34 authorizes 
the formation and regulation of self-regulatory organizations 
such as the NASD and further provides that they are governed by 
the SEC under the Act. Ex. "16". 
Section 19 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §78a-78jj, as 
amended, sets forth the obligations of self-regulatory 
organizations such as the NASD. Section 19(g)(1), Compliance and 
Enforcement of Compliance, provides in part: 
Every self-regulatory organization shall 
comply with the provisions of this title, the 
rules and regulations thereunder, and its own 
rules, . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
Section 19(h)(2) provides in substance that the NASD may expel a 
member who has violated its rules and regulations. Ex. "16". 
Section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19 34, 15 U.S.C. 
§78aa, provides that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction 
over "the rules and regulations thereunder," etc., including "all 
suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any 
liability or duty created by this title or the rules and 
regulations thereunder." Ex. "16". Based on §15A and §19 
referred to above, this necessarily includes the NASD Rules of 
Fair Practice. 
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-7920, July 19, 1966, 
31 F.R. 10076 authorizes the completion, by broker-dealers, of 
brokerage transactions during a 10-day SEC trading suspension. 
Ex. "17". 
Utah Code Ann. §61-1-24 and §61-1-27 provide that the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act must be applied in uniformity and in 
harmony with the federal securities laws (i.e., comity), and, by 
virtue of the Exchange Act, the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. 
Ex. "14". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. The case is one of first impression and 
based on the competing nature of the state and federal securities 
regulatory interests involved, it is of significant and 
substantial Constitutional dimension. It further meets the 
considerations set forth in Rule 46(a), (c) and (d). 
Specifically, this case is an appeal from the Court of 
Appeals1 amended opinion of February 19, 1992, upholding a "final 
agency action" adopted by the executive director of the 
Department of Commerce. 
The amended opinion may be summed-up thus: While the 
Johnsons admittedly did what they did to avoid a breach of pre-
exis t ing federal , executory contracts entered into in i n t e r s t a t e 
commerce - - something required of them by the NASD ( i . e . , the 
federal regulatory scheme) — and, while the Johnsons admittedly 
did not v io la te the law in any way, t he i r purchase of stock to 
prevent "buy-ins"1 at a r t i f i c i a l and manipulated prices and thus 
complete such executory contracts "frustrated" or undermined the 
" in ten t , scope or purpose" of a March 1, 1989, Summary Order 
entered by the Division under §14(3), an order which only removed 
the ava i l ab i l i t y of cer ta in types of "offers or sa les" of 
s ecu r i t i e s itemized in §14(2). As a r e su l t , the amended opinion 
concludes (1) tha t the Johnsons engaged in "dishonest or 
unethical prac t ices" under §6(1)(g) , and (2) tha t i t was "in the 
public in t e res t " under §6(1)(g) to put them out of business. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts. 
As a resu l t of the Divis ion 's mistaken bel ief tha t the Johnsons 
made a "fortune" covering the i r "short" pos i t i ons , 2 the 
Division, on April 27, 1989, brought administrat ive adjudicative 
proceedings against Johnson-Bowles and Johnson to revoke the i r 
r eg i s t r a t ions as a broker-dealer and agent, respect ively . In 
1
 "Buy-ins" are necessary occurrences in the securities brokerage business when a 
broker has not, or cannot, make timely delivery to the buying broker or its clearing agent. 
"Buy-in" procedure is set forth in Section 59 of the NASD Uniform Practice Code, NASD Manual 
(CCH), "Close-Out Procedure," H3559, pp. 3575-3583, Rel. #308 (April 1991). 
2 While the Division was absolutely convinced that the Johnsons made a fortune in 
covering their "short" positions, the fact is that excluding well over $150,000 in attorney's and 
accountant's fees and costs incurred in the Judge Greene l i t igation (see Ex. " 1 " , p. 3) — an 
amount with further excludes this l i t igat ion and subsequent l i t igation with Otra Clearing — 
Johnson-Bowles only made a "profit" on covering its "short" positions in the amount of $6,500. 
Hearing testimony of Johnson-Bowies' independent auditor, R. 1045. 
July 1989, the Division amended i t s pe t i t i ons and deleted one of 
three counts which charged the Johnsons with a d i r ec t v io la t ion 
of the Divis ion 's Summary Order of March 1, 1989, an order 
entered under §61-1-14(3)- (See Exs. "8" and "6") One of the 
remaining two counts was dismissed by the ALJ under Rule 
12(b)(6) . This l e f t one count which charged the Johnsons with 
f ,aid[ing] in the v io la t ion of §61-1-7 of the Act." See p. 6, 
116-17, amended p e t i t i o n s , Ex. " 8 " . 3 On July 16, 1990, the 
Johnsons went to a fu l l hearing before the Secur i t ies Advisory 
Board on the count charging them with a v io la t ion of Utah Code 
Ann. §61-1-6(1)(g) and the Divis ion 's corol lary rule promulgated 
thereunder. 
On August 10, 1990, the Secur i t ies Advisory Board, with the 
August 13, approval of the d i rec tor of the Division, issued 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Order (Ex. "4") . In 
finding tha t Mr. Johnson's unsol ic i ted purchases were " t rading," 
tha t i s , conduct d i r ec t ly prohibited by the Summary Order, the 
d i rec tor found them gui l ty of "dishonest or unethical 
p r ac t i ce s . " In further finding tha t suspending or revoking the i r 
l icenses was [somehow] "in the public i n t e r e s t , " the Division 
suspended the Johnsons1 brokerage l icenses for one year and put 
them on probation for two years . 
^ That the Division's sole theory of l i ab i l i t y below was that the mere purchase of 
securities constituted "aiding and abetting" the alleged non-exempt sale thereof is not only 
confirmed by the language of Count I of the amended petitions (Ex. "8", p. 6, 1|'s 16-17) but i t 
is further confirmed by the testimony of Division witness Broker-Dealer Section Director Kathleen 
C. McGinley, Esq., at the July 16, 1990 t r i a l . See Ex. "A" to the Johnsons' Request for Agency 
Review, p. 37, lines 7-9, R. 896 and p. 40, lines~?2-25, p. 41, lines 1-3, R. 899-900; see also 
p. 72, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
- i n -
The August 10, 1990, order (Ex. "4") was adopted by the 
executive director of the Department of Commerce as a "final 
agency action" on October 29, 1990 (Ex. "3"). Appeal to the 
Court of Appeals ensued and on November 29, 1991, the Court of 
Appeals issued a written opinion (Ex. "2") upholding such "final 
agency action." 
On December 13, 1991, the Johnsons filed a Petition for 
Rehearing. The Petition was granted. This is because the Court 
of Appeals analyzed and applied the wrong statute to the entire 
case (i.e., §61-1-12, governing registered securities). The 
Court further came to realize that even if Mr. Johnson's conduct 
was tantamount to "trading," trading comes exclusively under the 
jurisdiction of the Exchange Act and an order entered under 
§14(3) cannot be deemed a "stop trading order." As a result, a 
dramatically amended opinion was issued on February 19, 1992 
(Ex. "1"). 
The amended opinion now holds that the Johnsons did not 
violate the Summary Order directly. On the contrary, the 
Johnsons merely undermined or "frustrated" the "purpose, scope or 
intent" of the Division's March 1, 1989, Summary Order. 
Ironically, the Johnsons were never charged with such. See Ex. 
"8", p. 6, Ifs 16-17. Further, while the Johnsons were 
admittedly instrumental in getting the Summary Order entered, the 
Court of Appeals (and the Division) ignores that such Order 
simply caused U.S.A. Medical stock to attain a price it was 
worth — that is, next to nothing. This is because, according to 
J u d g e G r e e n e , U.S .A. Medica l s t o c k was " f r a u d u l e n t l y i s s u e d , " had 
no i n t r i n s i c v a l u e t o b e g i n w i t h , and i t s marke t p r i c e was 
" m a n i p u l a t e d . " Ex. " 1 " , p . 3 . As a r e s u l t , and c o n t r a r y t o t h e 
p r e m i s e of t h e amended o p i n i o n , t h e r e was no " f i n a n c i a l g a i n " t o 
be had by s u b s e q u e n t l y p u r c h a s i n g t h e s t o c k a t a p r i c e even 
e x c e e d i n g what i t s hou ld have been from day o n e . F u r t h e r , t h e 
D i v i s i o n d i d what i t shou ld have done r e g a r d l e s s of t h e J o h n s o n s ' 
p r e d i c a m e n t and , c o n t r a r y t o t h e amended o p i n i o n , t h e D i v i s i o n 
c e r t a i n l y d i d n ' t e n t e r t h e Summary Order a s some s p e c i a l " f a v o r " 
t o t h e J o h n s o n s . 4 Ex. " 1 " , p . 2 1 , 1 s t 1 . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I n t h e i n t e r e s t of complying w i t h Ru le 4 9 ( d ) , r e f e r e n c e i s 
made t o t h e Cour t of A p p e a l s ' S t a t e m e n t of F a c t s . Ex. " 1 " ; 
p p . 1-6. T h i s s c a n t y and o m i s s i v e v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s i s 
a c c u r a t e on i t s f a c e , however , i t d o e s n o t a r t i c u l a t e t h e f a c t 
t h a t t h e J o h n s o n s were n o t i n p a r i d e l i c t o w i t h t h e 
U.S .A. Med ica l c o n s p i r a t o r s ( i . e . , t h e J o h n s o n s had no c o n n e c t i o n 
t o t h e r e a s o n s t h e s t o c k was e i t h e r " i l l e g a l l y i s s u e d " o r i t s 
p r i c e " m a n i p u l a t e d " ) , t h a t t h e J o h n s o n s were " w h i s t l e b l o w e r s " and 
v i c t i m s of a " s h o r t s q u e e z e " f r aud scheme, and , as a r e s u l t of 
t h e i r n o b l e c o n d u c t i n e x p o s i n g t h e f r a u d — i n which Judge 
4
 The Division was admittedly Infuriated that the Johnsons allegedly "took 
advantage" of i ts Summary Order. To "teach them a lesson," i t init iated the proceedings against 
the Johnsons. Respecting the wrath that a government agency is capable of wielding upon those 
who apparently annoy or embarrass i t , the Court might compare the ironic similarity between this 
case and SEC v. Dirks, (U.S. Sup. Ct. , July 1, 1983) 463 U.S. 646, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 
911, ['82-'83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1|99,255, n. 8, p. 96,124 ("JUSTICE 
BLACKMUN's dissenting opinion minimizes the role Dirks played in making public the Equity Funding 
Fraud . . . . The dissent would rewrite the history of Dirks' extensive investigative efforts . . 
. . Largely thanks to Dirks one of the most infamous frauds in recent memory was uncovered and 
exposed, while the record shows that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate 
Equity Funding.") [emphasis added] 
Greene declined to go one step further to declare outstanding 
contracts void for illegality — the Johnsons were left in the 
dire predicament of having to somehow honor various federal 
executory contracts.5 
ARGUMENT 
I. MR. JOHNSON'S PURCHASES DID NOT CAUSE OR RESULT IN 
A DISTRIBUTION OP U.S.A. MEDICAL STOCK TO UTAH 
RESIDENTS, THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF THE DIVISION'S 
SUMMARY ORDER. AS A RESULT, THE JOHNSONS1 CONDUCT 
COULD NOT HAVE FRUSTRATED THE "INTENT, SCOPE OR 
PURPOSE" OF SUCH ORDER AS A MATTER OF LAW. MORE 
IMPORTANTLY, BECAUSE THE JOHNSONS1 CONDUCT HAD NO 
ADVERSE EFFECT ON A UTAH RESIDENT, THERE IS NO BASIS 
TO CONCLUDE THAT REVOKING OR SUSPENDING THEIR LICENSES 
WAS "IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST" — A REQUIREMENT OF 
§61-1-6(1). 
While the amended opinion no longer holds that the Johnsons 
directly violated the Summary Order (a conclusion initially 
embraced by the Court of Appeals) and that, in fact, the Johnsons 
didn't violate the law at all, the opinion concludes that the 
Johnsons "frustrated" the "intent, scope or purpose" of the 
Summary Order. As a result, the amended opinion rather 
dexterously embraces the same result as that obtained in the 
initial opinion. While the Johnsons have never been charged with 
"frustrating" the Summary Order, no explanation of how the 
Johnsons "frustrated" the order is offered; nor why the Johnsons' 
conduct is "dishonest or unethical"; nor why purchasing stock 
under the circumstances is a "practice" (other than stating at 
the outset that "selling short" is a "practice"); nor is any 
explanation given as to why putting the Johnsons out of business 
See "Relevant Facts," pp. 7-19, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
merely for completing Johnson-Bowles1 federal executory contracts 
is conceivably "in the public interest" — requirements under 
§61-1-6(1)- Ex. "10". 
In Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 
U.S. 233, 92 S.Ct. 898, 31 L.Ed.2d 170 (1972), the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in upholding the reversal of an FTC cease-and-desist 
order, held that "[the Court of Appeals1] opinion is barren of 
any attempt to rest its order on the unfairness of particular 
competitive practices or on considerations of consumer interests. 
Nor did the FTC articulate any standards by which such 
alternative assessments might be made." 405 U.S. at pp. 245-249. 
The amended opinion in this case is no less bereft of explanation 
and thus, no less erroneous. 
Instead of analyzing the purpose of the Summary Order, the 
amended opinion applies Morton Int1! infra with a vengeance and 
holds that if an agency says conduct is a "dishonest or unethical 
practice" and that it thinks the suspension of a brokerage 
license is "in the public interest," that is good enough. Yet 
comparing the Court of Appeals1 two diverse decisions, including 
the fact that it initially applied the wrong statute, there is 
little dispute that the Court of Appeals has had enormous 
difficulty grappling with the issues this case presents. 
In analyzing §14(3), the Court of Appeals applies its 
holding in Tasters Ltd., Inc. v. Department of Employment 
Security, 172 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 819 P.2d 361 (Utah App. 1991) 
(citing Morton Int'l v. Auditing Div. of the Utah State Tax 
_ 1 A _ 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d at 585 (Utah 1991)). Ex. "1", p. 7. Tasters 
involved a specific grant of statutory authority to the agency. 
172 Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. While the statutory deference accorded 
the Division may allow it great leeway with respect to the 
reasons for implementing a Summary Order under §14(3), nothing in 
§14(3) allows the Division to spontaneously bring "purchases" (as 
opposed to "offers or sales" under §14(2)) within the reach of 
§14(3), let alone §6(1)(g). Furthermore, there is no indication 
that the legislature gave the Division unreviewable authority to 
determine, as a matter of law, that the mere purchase of stock 
sold without a §14(2) exemption is a "dishonest or unethical 
practice" which undermines, as a matter of law, a Summary Order 
designed to temporarily remove certain, specific exemptions for 
the mere "offer or sale" of securities. Further, no agency 
discretion exists to say that, by mere allegation, an unelected 
government official may dictate what constitutes a "dishonest or 
unethical practice" in the securities industry and that that is 
the end of the matter. Yet this is what the Court of Appeals has 
concluded by shirking its responsibility to discuss what the 
intent of the Summary Order was, why the conduct in issue is 
"dishonest or unethical," why it is a "practice" to boot, and 
worse still, why suspending or revoking the Johnsons' licenses 
under the circumstances is even remotely "in the public 
interest." Accordingly, and because the amended opinion pays 
mere lip service to these terms, the opinion has no basis. FTC 
v. Sperry & Hutchinson, supra. 
In i t s amended opinion, i t i s acknowledged — for the f i r s t 
time — tha t the Johnsons1 conduct was not technical ly "against 
the law." Ex. " 1 " , p . 19 (c i t ing Heinecke v. Department of 
Commerce, 158 Utah Adv. Rep. 55, 810 P.2d 459, 465-66 (Utah 
App. 1991).6 This i s a vast d i s t i nc t i on between the amended 
opinion (Ex. "1") and the i n i t i a l opinion (Ex. "2") . Yet, while 
holding tha t the Johnsons are gui l ty under §6(1)(g) even i f they 
d i d n ' t v io l a t e any law, the Court of Appeals proceeds to s t a t e : 
I t would be d i f f i c u l t to imagine a more 
wi l l fu l v io la t ion of the i n t en t , scope and 
purpose of an order than tha t presented in 
t h i s case. 
Ex. " 1 " , p . 21, 1st 1. The question i s why? What did the 
Johnsons do to "wil l ful ly" v io la te the " in ten t , scope and 
purpose" of the an order designed to prevent the d i s t r i bu t i on of 
U.S.A. Medical s ecu r i t i e s to innocent Utah inves to r / r e s iden t s , 
even assuming such order was in effect beyond ten days? (See 
Argument IV below.) No answer to t h i s question i s given. 
If the scope of the Summary Order was to prevent 
unknowledgeable Utah res idents from acquiring U.S.A. Medical 
6
 With al l due respect to the Court of Appeals, i t 1s malignantly preposterous to 
analogize this case to Heinecke. Heinecke Involved a male nurse who seduced and had sex with a 
recovering patient — a patient with severe psychological disorders. I t takes l i t t l e mental 
dexterity to realize that such conduct is contrary to what a "nurse" is by definition and that 
such conduct runs the risk of undermining a vulnerable and imbalanced patient's recovery. In 
this case, assuming ad arguendo that the Johnsons were omniscient enough to know in advance how 
the Division intendecTto interpret i ts Summary Order, i t was reasonable under the circumstances 
for the Johnsons to choose compliance with the NASD Rules of Fair Practice over waiting 
helplessly for $500,000 worth of "buy-Ins" to be executed ( I . e . , being sitting ducks), something 
the Division contends the Johnsons should have done. In Heinecke, the nurse was presented with 
no conflict at a l l , let alone a federal/state conflict, and common sense dictates that i t is not 
reasonable for a nurse to choose his own sexual gratification over considerations of the 
patient's mental well-being and recovery. Furthermore, the nurse in Heinecke was not presented 
with the choice of having to have sex with the patient in order to keep his federal license to 
practice nursing (assuming there were such a license) and thereby maintain his livelihood, a 
choice the Johnsons, by analogy, had to make in order to remain in good standing with the NASD 
and to keep from f i l ing bankruptcy and thus continue 1n business. 
stock after March 1, 1989, Mr. Johnson's conduct in no way 
undermined such purpose. Mr. Johnson, himself a sophisticated 
and knowledgeable purchaser, was well aware of U.S.A. Medical and 
all circumstances surrounding it. As a result, Mr. Johnson was 
not within the class of persons the Order was designed to 
protect. S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124-125 
(1953) (securities laws do not apply to those who don't need the 
protections afforded by them).7 At the same time, the Utah 
Uniform Securities Act, as effective 1989, did not regulate 
transactions with out-of-state residents. Ex. "15". In this 
case it is certainly arguable (though not dispositive) that Mr. 
Johnson's sellers really sold out-of-state. Accordingly, the 
amended opinion reads an intent and purpose beyond the reach of 
the Utah Uniform Securities Act and therefore, the Division's 
power. 
It is furthermore undisputed that Mr. Johnson did not solicit 
those from whom he purchased U.S.A. Medical stock "during March 
1989." (See Ex. 4, p. 6, 112; see also Affidavits attached to 
Ex. "5") No one was deceived, cheated or lied to; no one was not 
told the truth; none wants his worthless U.S.A. Medical stock 
back in exchange for Mr. Johnson's money. See e.g., the 
Johnsons' Brief, pp. 48-53. The Johnsons also singlehandedly 
financed the uncovering of a massive fraud and market 
manipulation, something no one else was willing to do. It is 
thus hypocritical for the Court of Appeals to complain about the 
7 See pp. 60-62, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
Johnsons' conduct relative to an order which would not exist but 
for the Johnsons' singular and noble efforts. Ex. "1", p. 21, 
1st I. Ironically, the opinion even goes so far as to criticize 
the Johnsons' efforts to get the SEC and the Division to 
investigate U.S.A. Medical as if the SEC and Division had no 
purpose or reason for their mutual existence. Id. 
Authority holds that if a person acts in "good faith," the 
conduct cannot be violative of an "ethical standard." Buchman 
v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 553 F.2d 816, 821 (2nd 
Cir. 1977), a decision the Court of Appeals chooses to ignore. 
In this case, there can be no dispute that the Johnsons acted in 
"good faith" in doing what they thought they had to to protect 
themselves, four fellow-NASD members, and Midwest Clearing 
Corporation, Johnson-Bowles' own clearing agent and the entity 
upon whom it was dependent to remain in business. How then can 
the Johnsons be faulted? 
The Court of Appeals quotes from the Division's August 10, 
1990, order in which the Division not only erroneously deemed 
Mr. Johnson's conduct as "trading" but which compounds its error 
by stating that [the Johnsons] were: 
driven by a desire to realize monetary gain 
and/or avoid financial loss and that [the 
Johnson's] willingness to engage in trading 
the securities shifted over time, depending on 
whatever would promote [their] economic 
interests. [Emphasis added.] 
Ex. "1", p. 21. While still clinging to the discarded idea that 
Mr. Johnson's conduct was "trading" (see also Ex. "1", p. 8 
bott., 11 top, 13 top, and 19 top), is the Court of Appeals also 
saying that the extent to which one avoids being defrauded by 
others is, of all things, reportable or taxable income and thus, 
the Johnsons "profited" by their conduct? 
Relying on the magic words "agency discretion" or "agency 
expertise," the opinion begs the very question of whether the 
Johnsons1 conduct was indeed a "dishonest or unethical practice." 
Ex. "1", p. 18. The Johnsons and those like them are left with 
no understanding as to why the conduct is allegedly a "dishonest 
or unethical practice" in the securities industry or even why 
revoking or suspending their licenses is "in the public 
interest." While dodging an analysis of why or how, the amended 
opinion holds that, under Morton, if the Division says the 
conduct is, it is. Nothing more is apparently necessary. This 
is not judicial review. Cf. Brewster v. Maryland Securities 
Commissioner, 76 Md. App. 722, 548 A.2d 157, [!88-!90 Transfer 
Binder] Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 172,906 (Md. App. 1988), 
cert, denied 109 U.S. 2449 (1989), a decision the Court of 
Appeals also ignores and which is helpful to a proper §6(1)(g) 
analysis.8 
Applying a reasonableness/rationality (or even a correctness-
of-error) standard for legal conclusions, the Court of Appeals 
should have analyzed whether buying stock under the circumstances 
undermines or frustrates a Summary Order entered under §14(3), an 
order which, in order to protect innocent Utah investors, only 
suspends certain, specific "offers or sales" itemized in §14(2). 
8 See pp. 48-53, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
If purchasing stock does indeed so "frustrate" or undermine such 
an order, the next step is to determine how or why such conduct, 
under the circumstances, constitutes a "dishonest or unethical 
practice" in the securities business and why it is then "in the 
public interest" to discipline the Johnsons. See Brewster supra. 
The Court of Appeals' amended opinion is illogical, 
irrational and unreasonable. Further, because the facts of this 
case are stipulated to (Ex. "5"), the Court of Appeals ignores 
its own standard of review enunciated in Vali Convalescent 
v. Division of Health Care Financing, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 27, 
797 P.2d 438 (Utah App. 1990) (if facts are stipulated to, the 
court reviews under a correctness-of-error standard). 
II. THERE IS A DIAMETRIC CONFLICT BETWEEN THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF ART. Ill, SECT. I, NASD RULES OF FAIR 
PRACTICE AND THE DIVISION'S INTERPRETATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF ITS SUMMARY ORDER OF MARCH 1, 1989. 
UNDER THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
MANDATE OF COMITY, THE JOHNSONS1 EFFORTS TO COMPLY 
WITH THE FEDERAL REGULATORY SCHEME PRE-EMPT AND 
OUTWEIGH THE STATE'S ALLEGED "INTEREST" IN REVOKING OR 
SUSPENDING THE JOHNSONS' STATE BROKERAGE LICENSES FOR 
THAT SAME CONDUCT. 
The Court of Appeals closes its eyes to the blatant conflict 
between the Division's amended petitions and the Johnsons' 
obligations under the NASD Rules of Fair Practice. Ex. "1", 
pp. 9-11. Article III, §1, NASD Rules of Fair Practice, is 
interpreted by the NASD and SEC to require a broker-dealer and 
broker to honor all securities transactions and/or all corollary 
"buy-ins" or they wi l l be subject to severe d i s c ip l i ne , including 
subs tan t ia l f ines , suspension, and even expulsion from the NASD.9 
A conf l ic t therefore ex i s t s because no one can honor and 
dishonor a contract at the same time. In shor t , i t was a 
"physical impossibi l i ty" to comply with both the federal and 
s t a t e schemes of regulation simultaneously. Cf, Ex. " 1 " , p. 9 
bo t t . I f the Johnsons complied with one scheme, they violated 
the other . This i s simple enough. Yet the amended opinion i s 
s i l e n t on how the NASD and the SEC in te rpre t Ar t ic le I I I , §1 of 
i t s Rules of Fair Pract ice even though the law in t h i s regard was 
conspicuously before the Court of Appeals. Saying i t another 
way, there can be no dispute tha t the Johnsons stood the r isk of 
being expelled from (and severely fined by) the NASD had they 
nei ther honored the contracts nor honored subsequent "buy-ins," 
the l a t t e r of which would eventually have to have been undertaken 
by t h i r d - p a r t i e s to even-out such cont rac ts . Id. Contrary to 
the issues at hand, the amended opinion s t a t e s : 
. . . the Johnsons have fai led to show tha t 
such conf l ic t would have to be resolved in 
favor of the NASD. 
Ex. " 1 " , p . 9, 1st I . Who would "win," as i f t h i s case were some 
kind of a t h l e t i c competition, i s not the i ssue . If i t i s , i t i s 
the Court of Appeals1 task to "resolve" such a conf l i c t , a task 
y
 NASD Manual, (CCH) H2151 at p. 2013-3 and 1|3501, et seq. (May 1989); see Brief 
Ex. H; R. 176-179; see also Friedman & Co. 45 S.E.C. 393 (1973J1 fall ing to honor trades is a 
violation of Art. ITT7 §1 and expulsion from NASD and revocation without qualification may be 
imposed); In re; Shaskan & Co., Inc., SEC Docket 776 (May 28, 1976) (NASD suspended and imposed 
fine on brokers for fai l ing to honor trades with other NASD members); In The Matter of the 
Application of Nassau Securities Service, November 19, 1964, SEC Ex. Act. Release No. 7464, 42 
S.E.C. 445, [ ,64- ,66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) H77,158 (broker sanctioned for 
fai l ing to honor "buy-in" even though he claimed that stock was manipulated and i t may well have 
been). See also references to §§15A and 19 of the Exchange Act in Ex. "16". 
i t has shirked. On the contrary, the issue i s why should a 
person be placed in the posi t ion of choosing his s t a t e l icense 
over his federal l i cense or vice-versa? Showing who would 
prevai l in such a conf l ic t (whatever tha t means) or which l icense 
i s more important begs the question and i s i r r e l e v a n t . The issue 
i s the conf l ic t i t s e l f , a conf l ic t in regulat ion which was facing 
the Johnsons and, assuming they knew what the Division would do, 
put them in a posi t ion of having to stand up and s i t down at the 
same time.iO The amended opinion, for no reason, simply 
disregards the we l l - se t t l ed in te rp re ta t ions of the NASD Rules of 
Fair Pract ice and ru th less ly concludes tha t the Johnsons1 d i re 
predicament — the sole reason for t h e i r conduct — i s 
i r r e l evan t . 
The Johnsons have never argued tha t the NASD Rules of Fair 
Pract ice are tantamount to a federal s t a t u t e . On the contrary, 
i t i s undisputed tha t the NASD Rules of Fair Pract ice are merely 
an in tegra l par t of the federal regulatory scheme — a scheme 
which regulated the Johnsons and those l i ke them in the conduct 
of t h e i r business on a dai ly b a s i s . 1 1 See Western Capital & 
1 U
 That the Johnsons were 1n a complete quandary is evidenced by the position they 
took in their letter of March 21, 1989, to the NASD, a pronouncement relied on heavily by the 
Court of Appeals to apparently show "knowledge," a non-issue. Ex. " 1 " , p. 16, top. What 
"knowledge" there was was the result of Judge Greene's ruling and nothing else. Ex. " 1 " , p. 3. 
The Johnsons simply refused to believe, even by March 21, 1989, that Judge Greene's ruling did 
not, in some way, help them relative to prospective "buy-ins." In fact, such self-serving 
letter , which everyone ignored, only demonstrates the confusion and panic confronting the 
Johnsons as a result of Judge Greene's ruling and that they had no choice but to take a contrary 
position later on. In short, because Otra had effected a $104,600 "buy-in" at 70<2 per share and 
nothing existed to prevent the others from doing the same, the letter only underscores the 
Johnsons' predicament. 
1 1
 As stated earlier and as set forth in Ex. "IB", the NASD was created under the 
Section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, an Act created to regulate the trading of 
securities in interstate commerce. Accordingly, there can be l i t t l e dispute that the NASD and 
its own rules form part of the overall federal regulatory scheme. I t is further significant that 
under the Exchange Act al l broker-dealers and brokers who are not members of a national 
S e c u r i t i e s , I n c . v . Knudsv ig , 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 5 , 6 7 - 6 8 , 768 
P.2d 989 , 992-994 (Utah App. 1989) — t h e Cour t of Appea l s 1 own 
d e c i s i o n which acknowledges t h e p r e - e m p t i v e s t a t u s of t h e NASD 
Ru les of F a i r P r a c t i c e . 
The re i s a l s o no d i s p u t e t h a t t h e NASD R u l e s of F a i r P r a c t i c e 
n e c e s s a r i l y r e l a t e t o t h e i d e a of c o m i t y , a c o n c e p t e x p r e s s l y 
embodied i n §§24 and 2 7 , Utah Uniform S e c u r i t i e s Act and t h e 
f e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n . 1 2 Yet c o m i t y , i n c l u d i n g §61-1-24 and 
§ 6 1 - 1 - 2 7 , i s n e v e r even a l l u d e d t o i n t h e o p i n i o n . See Ex. " 1 4 " . 
I n s t e a d , comi ty i s c u r s o r i l y d e a l t w i t h l i k e s e v e r a l of t h e 
J o h n s o n s 1 o t h e r C o n s t i t u t i o n a l a rgument s i n f o o t n o t e 5 , p . 11 of 
t h e amended o p i n i o n . 
I I I . THE INTERESTS OF FOUR OUT-OF-STATE 
BROKER-DEALERS AND ONE MAJOR OUT-OF-STATE CLEARING 
CORPORATION IN HAVING THEIR NASD CONTRACTS WITH 
JOHNSON-BOWLES COMPLETED FAR OUTWEIGH ANY "LOCAL 
PUTATIVE BENEFIT" DERIVED FROM REVOKING OR SUSPENDING 
THE JOHNSONS1 LICENSES WITH THE DIVISION. AS A 
RESULT, THE REGULATION ENGAGED IN BY THE DIVISION IS 
REPUGNANT TO THE COMMERCE CLAUSE.13 
On p . 1 1 - 1 3 , Ex. " 1 , " t h e Cour t of Appea l s h o l d s t h a t t h e r e 
i s no Commerce C l a u s e v i o l a t i o n s imply b e c a u s e t h e D i v i s i o n may 
g i v e e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l e f f e c t t o i t s Summary Order ( i . e . , U t a h ' s 
securities exchange must, by law, be registered with the NASD. For example, in 1983, the SEC did 
away with SECO ("SEC Only"), an alternative means of registering with the SEC that competed, to a 
small degree, with the NASD. (R. 9, top) Thus, everyone in the business not registered with an 
exchange is registered with the NASD. This is confirmed by Schedule C to the NASD By-Laws which 
require the registration of all persons "who are engaged in the investment banking or securities 
business" . . . . NASD Manual (CCH) H1784, p. 1533 and H1785, p. 1541, Rel. #304 (Oct. 1990). 
12 See p. 47, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
13 The Johnsons have also argued that the Division's efforts to put them 
out-of-business are violative of their right to be free from contractual interference by a state 
in violation of the Art. I , §18 of the Utah Constitution and Art. I . §10, c l . 1 of the federal 
Constitution. See e.g. , p. 48, the Johnsons' Brief below. These and other Rule 12(b)(6) 
arguments have Been consistently ignored by the Court of Appeals, the executive director of the 
Department of Commerce, the Division and Securities Advisory Board, and the ALJ. 
Blue Sky laws). Ex. "1", p. 12. This conclusion is plain wrong 
because, as aforesaid, during 1989 the legislature expressly 
restricted application of the Act to Utah residents only. See 
Ex. "15", a copy of §61-1-26(3), effective 1989; see also Singer 
v. Magnavox, 380 A.2d 969, 981, ['71-"78 Transfer Binder] Blue 
Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 171,399 (Del. 1977). 
Nonetheless, a Commerce Clause analysis in the Division!s 
favor requires a determination that the burdens imposed on 
interstate commerce are incidental compared to the "local 
putative benefits" derived from the state regulation. Ex. "1", 
p. 12, 1st full I. In this case, there is no "local putative 
benefit" to be derived from revoking or suspending the Johnsons1 
licenses with the Division merely because Mr. Johnson bought 
397,900 shares of U.S.A. Medical stock to complete pre-existing, 
federal, executory contracts undertaken with out-of-state 
residents in interstate commerce and as required by the NASD. To 
be sure, why would any Utah resident care whether the Johnsons' 
licenses are revoked or suspended for such conduct? How does 
such conduct even relate to the legitimate interests of a Utah 
resident? 
On the other hand, Spear, Leeds & Kellog, William Frankel & 
Co., M.S. Myerson & Co., Paragon Capital Corporation, and Midwest 
Clearing Corporation — all out-of-state residents doing no 
business in Utah — were together owed 397,900 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical stock. Were these entities required to dip into 
their own pockets and expend $500,000 or more to effect "buy-ins" 
at a r t i f i c i a l and manipulated pr ices — prices over which they 
too had no control — and, were they then unable to co l l ec t the 
difference from Johnson-Bowles, a s igni f icant burden, including 
subs tan t ia l damage, would necessar i ly have been imposed upon 
them. Common sense d i c t a t e s tha t t h e i r i n t e r e s t s in completing 
the contracts far outweigh the i n t e r e s t s of any Utah resident in 
seeing Johnson-Bowles put out of bus iness . 1 4 In addit ion, what 
difference does i t make i f Johnson-Bowles bought the stock or one 
of the foregoing e n t i t i e s bought the stock for Johnson-Bowles1 
account? The contracts could not remain open and the stock had 
to be bought sooner or l a t e r by someone. What difference does i t 
make who bought the stock? Doesn't Johnson-Bowles have the same 
r igh ts as those to whom i t owed stock? If not , why? Is i t 
merely because Johnson-Bowles i s a Utah corporation and 
Mr. Johnson himself i s a Utah resident? Why should t h i s 
matter? The Court of Appeals, while having two cracks at t h i s 
case, offers no explanation. 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion i s u n r e a l i s t i c and ignores 
the facts of t h i s case: the Divis ion 's ef for ts to enforce the i r 
Summary Order under the circumstances imposes an excessive burden 
on ou t -o f - s ta te res idents (including the Johnsons) in re la t ion to 
the i n t e r e s t s of any Utah resident in seeing the Johnsons put out 
of business. Accordingly, the amended opinion sanctions a 
x
^ Having been in business over 12 years, Johnson-Bowles had approximately 5,000 
retail customers, many of whom had stock in their accounts, and the large majority of whom are 
Utah residents. Johnson-Bowles also had at least 12 employees, al l of whom are Utah residents 
and who had to seek other employment as a result of these proceedings. The additional question 
is: Doesn't this substantial number of Utah residents count for anything in the Court of Appeals' 
undefined conception of "in the public interest?" 
violation of the Commerce Clause. 
IV. UNDER THE STANDARDS IN THE INDUSTRY, THE JOHNSONS 
HAD NO NOTICE THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO COMPLETE FEDERAL, 
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS WOULD SIMULTANEOUSLY BE DEEMED A 
"DISHONEST OR UNETHICAL PRACTICE" BY THE DIVISION. 
THE JOHNSONS WERE ALSO NEVER CHARGED WITH 
"FRUSTRATING" THE "INTENT, SCOPE OR PURPOSE" OF THE 
SUMMARY ORDER. FURTHERMORE, TO HOLD THAT A SINGLE 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL MAY SUMMARILY AND PERMANENTLY 
ENJOIN ALL CONCEIVABLE TRANSFERS OR SALES OF 
SECURITIES UNDER §61-1-14(3) IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
RESTRAINT ON ALIENATION AND AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
DELEGATION OF POWER TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. AS A 
RESULT, THE COURT OF APPEALS1 AMENDED OPINION VIOLATES 
DUE PROCESS AND IS OTHERWISE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
The amended opinion acknowledges that, prior to March 1, 
1989, the Johnsons tried to get the Division to do something 
about the U.S.A. Medical "short squeeze." The Division and the 
SEC declined to do anything — something which is their job, not 
the Johnsons — thereby forcing Johnson-Bowles to seek relief 
before Judge Greene. After Judge Greene ruled on February 28, 
1989, the Division jumped on the bandwagon and issued its Summary 
Order of March 1, 1989 (Ex. "6"). The Division knew that 
Johnson-Bowles was in a bind — the very purpose of the Judge 
Greene litigation. In fact, its agents and employees were 
present throughout the two-day preliminary injunction hearing. 
Yet even after the Division entered its Summary Order, it never 
told the Johnsons not to buy stock to complete the contracts. 
Further, anyone connected with the industry knows that securities 
laws only regulate "offers or sales," not unsolicited purchases. 
There is simply no industry standard or norm which would put the 
Johnsons on notice that buying stock to deliver out-of-state 
would in any way undermine the Summary Order. Cf. Brewster 
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v, Maryland Secur i t ies Commissioner, supra . Furthermore, on 
March 1, 1989, the very day the Summary Order was issued, Otra 
Clearing, a Utah licensed broker-dealer , bought U.S.A. Medical 
stock from two Utah resident broker-dealers and yet the Court of 
Appeals sees nothing wrong in such iden t ica l conduct, l e t alone 
the non-exempt sa les undertaken by Utah res ident broker-dealers 
P.B. Jameson and R.A. Johnson in d i r ec t v io la t ion of the Summary 
Order. Ex. " 1 " , p . 4 top. If Otra Clearing can purchase 150,000 
shares from two Utah residents with impunity, why can ' t 
Mr. Johnson purchase 397,900 shares from six Utah residents and a 
New York resident with the same impunity, especia l ly when he did 
such for the same reason as Otra ( i . e . , to complete open 
con t rac t s ) ? 1 5 The Divis ion 's answer i s tha t i t d idn ' t have the 
resources to do b a t t l e with everyone. See footnote 8, p. 7, 
Divis ion 's January 22, 1992, Response to Pe t i t ion for Rehearing 
below. Surely, t h i s i s no excuse or j u s t i f i c a t i o n for se lec t ive 
prosecution of the Johnsons. 
The Court of Appeals concludes tha t the Johnsons knew the i r 
conduct was chargeable by the Division by v i r tue of a March 21, 
1989, l e t t e r they wrote to the NASD. Ex. " l " , pp. 4 and 15-16. 
This i s a c l a s s i c non sequi tur . The Johnsons' own l e t t e r — a 
l e t t e r no one paid any a t ten t ion to — had nothing to do with the 
Division; i t was wri t ten in panic and was merely an attempt to 
1
^ This and other facts formed the basis of several Equal Protection arguments 
raised by the Johnsons which were also ignored not only by the Court of Appeals, but by the 
executive director of the Department of Commerce, the Securities Advisory Board and director of 
the Division, including the ALJ. See pp. 18-19 and 45-46, the Johnsons' Brief below; see also p. 
20, Reply Brief below and p. 7-9, Petition for Rehearing below. 
s t a l l or get Otra Clearing to back-off from co l lec t ing on i t s 
trumped-up "buy-in" with P.B. Jameson.16 Further, while i t was 
ignored by both Otra and the NASD, the l e t t e r preceded the 
Divis ion 's i n i t i a l pe t i t i ons by over a month. 
The Johnsons were only charged with "aiding" [and abet t ing] a 
v io la t ion of the Summary Order. (See Ex. "8" , p . 6, I ! s 16-17) 
The amended opinion holds tha t the Johnsons did not v io la te the 
law, a conclusion which necessar i ly means tha t the Johnsons did 
not "aid and abet" a d i rec t v io la t ion of such Order.1 7 As a 
r e s u l t , the Johnsons, u n t i l February 19, 1992, have s imi lar ly had 
no not ice tha t t he i r conduct al legedly "frustrated" the " in ten t , 
scope or purpose" of the Summary Order. The Court of Appeals has 
simply invented the Divis ion 's theory of the case and allowed the 
Division to accomplish something ind i rec t ly tha t i t could never 
do d i r e c t l y . This i s inherently unfair and t h i s Pe t i t ion i s the 
f i r s t time the Johnsons are able to respond to such charges. 
Accordingly, by holding the Johnsons gu i l ty on grounds of which 
the Johnsons never had not ice u n t i l the date of the amended 
opinion, the amended opinion i s i t s e l f v io l a t ive of due process 
( i . e . , n o t i c e ) . 
On p . 8 of the amended opinion, the Court of Appeals 
concludes tha t the March 1, 1989, Summary Order (Ex. "6") was 
"permanent" and therefore in effect a t the time of Mr. Johnson's 
1 6
 In other words, after the January 23, 1989, forward spl i t , U.S.A. Medical had 2.6 
million shares issued and outstanding. At $1.00 per share, the Company had a market 
capitalization of $26 million when, in real i ty, i t was insolvent. In fact, the "sales" appearing 
on its financial statement were merely proceeds from the market manipulation. See footnotes 6, 9 
and 10, pp. 9 and 11, the Johnsons' Brief below. 
17 See pp. 2-6, the Johnsons* Petition for Rehearing below. 
March 1989 purchases. The Johnsons have argued that such order, 
like an SEC trading suspension order entered summarily under 
§12(j) or (k) of the Exchange Act, is only valid for 10 days and, 
like a TRO, it cannot be "piggy-backed" for successive 10-day 
periods.18 Sloan v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 547 F.2d 
152, 157-158 (2nd Cir. 1976), cert, denied 434 U.S. 821, 98 
S.Ct. 63, 54 L.Ed.2d 77, reh. denied 434 U.S. 976, 98 S.Ct. 535, 
54 L.Ed.2d 468 (1977), afffd. 436 U.S. 103, 98 S.Ct. 1702, 56 
L.Ed.2d 148 (1978). In fact, under §12(k) of the Exchange Act, 
only the President of the United States may authorize the 
suspension of trading in a security beyond ten days. (See 
§12(k)(1)(B), Ex. "16") Furthermore, the Summary Order, by its 
own language, says nothing about being "permanent" and the 
director did nothing to extend it by or before March 10. It was 
only as late as March 27, 1989, nearly one month after its 
issuance, that the director finally took steps to make the 
Summary Order "permanent by default." Ex. "7". If such order 
expired by operation of law on March 10, 1989, and because the 
Division never proved that Mr. Johnson purchased between March 1 
and March 10, 1989 (Ex. 5, p. 3, 112), there is simply no basis 
to these entire proceedings. 
In Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 
443-445, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 93 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974), the U.S. Supreme 
Court held: 
It would be inconsistent with this basic 
1 0
 See H23, pp. 14-15 and pp. 75-76, the Johnsons' Brief below and pp. 21-23, the 
Johnsons' RepFy~~Brief below. 
pr inc ip le to countenance procedures whereby 
pa r t i e s against whom an injunction i s directed 
are l e f t to guess about i t s intended durat ion. 
Where a court intends to supplant such 
an order with a preliminary injunction of 
unlimited duration pending a f ina l decision on 
the merits or further order of the cour t , i t 
should issue an order c lear ly saying so. And 
where i t has not done so, a party against whom 
a temporary res t ra in ing order has issued may 
reasonably assume tha t the order has expired 
within the time l imi t s imposed by Rule 65(b). 
The Court of Appeals1 conclusion tha t a Summary Order entered 
under §14(3) i s "permanent" — even when i t doesn ' t so s t a t e — 
bel ies Granny Goose supra and further misreads l e g i s l a t i v e 
i n t en t . I f a Summary Order can be and i s "permanent" (even 
without so s t a t i n g ) , why would the l e g i s l a t u r e have included 
provisions in §14(3) for making such an order permanent? What 
would be the reason for making a permanent order permanent? Why 
did the Division take steps to make i t permanent nearly one month 
l a t e r ? The amended opinion provides no answer. 
More importantly, to give a s ingle government o f f i c i a l the 
power to summarily suspend a l l §14(2) exemptions permanently 
—when only the President of the United States has the power to 
suspend mere t rading of s ecu r i t i e s beyond ten days — i s an 
uncons t i tu t ional "taking" or r e s t r a i n t on a l iena t ion without due 
process. This i s because i t prevents stockholders from disposing 
of t h e i r p roper ty . 1 9 As a r e s u l t , to conclude tha t the d i rec tor 
i y
 In the securities regulatory context, the Johnsons have been unable to find any 
case law involving an alleged unconstitutional restraint on alienation. No doubt this is because 
under federal law, exemptions from registration (as opposed to trading) cannot be suspended. 
This issue would thus appear to be one of f i r s t impression. Cf. Sloan v. SEC, supra. In the 
civi l context, however, reference is made to Benson v. RMJ Securities Corp., 683 F.Supp. 359, 
371-372, [ ,87- ,88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1|93,723 at p. 98,358 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(discussing restraints on alienation of corporate stock and citing authorities); Globe y. Hasner, 
333 F.2d 413, 415 (2d Cir. 1964) cert, denied 379 U.S. 969, 85 S.Ct. 666, 13 L.Ed.2d 562 (1965) 
(restraints on alienation are disfavored and should be construed narrowly). 
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of t h e Div i s ion has power and a u t h o r i t y fa r beyond t h a t of the 
P re s iden t of t h e United S t a t e s f u r t h e r misreads the s t a t u t e o r , 
i f i t d o e s n ' t , t h e s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y de l ega t e s power to 
but one i n d i v i d u a l . 2 0 See e . g . , Bowsher v . Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 
106 S.Ct. 3181, 1391-92, 92 L.Ed.2d 583 (1986) (over turn ing the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act as an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l de l ega t ion of 
power); see a l s o pp. 30-36, t he Johnsons1 Br ief below d i scuss ing 
the non-de lega t ion and u l t r a - v i r e s d o c t r i n e s in a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
law, inc lud ing pp. 59-60 the reo f . 
Because i t i s i l l e g a l for a Summary Order t o cont inue in 
e f f e c t beyond 10 days , and, when t h e S e c u r i t i e s Advisory Board 
concluded t h a t t h e Johnsons v i o l a t e d only the Summary Order, not 
t he subsequent March 27, o rde r , t h e Court of Appeals dec i s ion has 
no b a s i s in f a c t , l e t a lone law, and must be summarily reversed . 
See Ex. "4" (d i s cus s ing only t h e March 1, o r d e r ) . F i n a l l y , 
because t h e amended opinion i s premised on an u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
de l ega t i on of a u t h o r i t y and a c l e a r misreading of l e g i s l a t i v e 
i n t e n t , t h e r e i s simply no l e g a l or f a c t u a l b a s i s with which to 
charge t he Johnsons with any misconduct, l e t a lone find them 
g u i l t y and suspend t h e i r l i c e n s e s . See Ex. " l " , p . 8. 
CONCLUSION 
z u
 By way of further example, the Securities Act of 1933 regulates the "offer or 
sale," not the trading of securities. The Utah Uniform Securities Act is patterned after the '33 
Act, not the '34 Act. Section 14(2) of the Utah Uniform Securities Act is the state counterpart 
to §4 of the '33 Act. There is nothing in the Securities Act of 1933 which allows the SEC, the 
President of the United States, or anyone else to suspend any §4 exemption from registration at 
a l l , let alone permanently. Thus, I t is remarkable that the amended opinion not only confers one 
unelected government off ic ial with the power and authority to suspend all §14(2) exemptions 
( i . e . , restrain the alienation of property) not merely for 10 days, but permanently. 
The amended opinion is premised on the undisclosed value 
judgment that Johnson-Bowles acted wrongly or improperly back in 
January 1989 because it had become "short" 53,000 shares of 
U.S.A. Medical. See Ex. "1", p. 2, 1st I, in which, at the very 
outset, "selling short" is referred to as a "practice". While 
Judge Greene admittedly concluded that Johnson-Bowles was 
negligent (perhaps even stupid) in having made a market in 
U.S.A. Medical stock, this conduct neither comprises the charges 
nor the findings against the Johnsons. More importantly, 
securities could never be traded if brokers didnft regularly sell 
stock they didn't have at that moment in their trading inventory. 
Contrary to the premise of the amended opinion, selling "short" 
is neither sinister nor unscrupulous: it is the very essence of 
"making a market" and it is essential to a free-market economy. 
Carlson v. Bagley Securities, Inc., DC Utah Case No. 89-C-1062A, 
Memorandum Opinion, p. 7, (April 8, 1991) (J. Anderson) (citing 1 
T. Hazen, The Law of Securities Regulation §10.3 at 531-32 (2d 
ed. 1990)). Based on this false premise alone, the amended 
opinion is fatally flawed. 
It is fundamentally unjust to punish someone for doing the 
"right" thing. In refusing to cover their "short" positions by 
purchasing U.S.A. Medical "control" stock from the conspirators 
"under the table" and instead, exposing the fraud, the Johnsons 
did the "right" thing. The Johnsons could just as easily have 
gone along with the fraud and today no one would know about it. 
Having made the decision to expose the fraud, the Court of 
_ -so -
Appeals1 amended opinion callously closes its eyes to the 
Johnsons1 predicament, a predicament resulting from Judge 
Greene's refusal to declare the outstanding brokerage contracts 
"void for illegality." Ex. "1", p. 3. The amended opinion 
ignores that the Johnsons were victims of an egregious fraud and 
that they did what they did to protect themselves, their 
fellow-NASD members, and to frustrate the entire fraud, namely, 
to prevent the U.S.A. Medical co-conspirators from reaping 
handsome illicit profits in that such criminals were sitting 
happily with sell orders on the other side of every prospective 
"buy-in." 
The amended opinion further ignores that the Johnsons acted 
as "whistleblowers" who financed the exposure of a fraud that no 
one else would, including the Division. That Johnson-Bowles 
never should have made a market in U.S.A. Medical in January 1989 
or that, faced with paying Otra a net $89,600 (and paying others 
more) and that, in a moment of panic and indecision it wrote a 
letter to the NASD on March 21, 1989, inconsistent with a 
position the Johnsons later found they had to take is irrelevant: 
Such acts do not comprise the charges against the Johnsons nor 
are such acts "dishonest or unethical practices" in and of 
themselves. Furthermore, even if the Johnsons "frustrated" the 
order on this one occasion, it does not amount to a "practice." 
The amended opinion reflects a fundamental misunderstanding 
and lack of appreciation of the realities and practicalities of 
making a living in this highly regulated, complex day and age. 
The opinion i s fundamentally ant i -business and r e f l ec t s no 
appreciat ion or sense of the Johnsons1 predicament and 
v ic t imizat ion . I t gives an agency the power to define and impose 
i t s employees1 view of morality upon the business world and to 
destroy people 's l ivel ihoods without explanation or 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n . In fac t , the "moral" of the amended opinion i s : 
Never come forward with knowledge of a fraud; on the contrary, i f 
caught in the middle, one should use a l l e f for t s to negot iate 
with the perpet ra tors and otherwise secre t ly further the f raud. 2 1 
Contrary to the dangerous s ignif icance the amended opinion 
gives the words "agency exper t ise" or "agency d iscre t ion" under 
Morton22 no reason has ever been s ta ted why the innocuous 
purchases in t h i s case cons t i tu t e a "dishonest or unethical 
prac t ice" and why such purchases j u s t i fy taking the Johnsons' 
l icenses away. Contrary to the opinion, the Johnsons did the 
r ight thing and people 's l ivel ihoods do matter- F ina l ly , 
" jud ic ia l review" in t h i s context was never intended to become an 
expensive and po in t less exerc ise . 
Z 1
 Thus, 1t can be readily argued that the amended opinion 1s against public policy. 
After the message this case communicates, 1t wil l be a long, long time before another broker-
dealer ever exposes a fraud. 
2 2
 Without meaning to detract from the merits of this Petition, important policy and 
civi l rights considerations are at stake in this case and other cases surely to arise like i t . 
For instance, one must consider whether i t is a truly fa i r for the law to be moving in the 
direction of allowing government agencies to make law, enforce that law, and then interpret that 
very law, including morality, thereby acting as legislator, prosecutor, judge, jury and 
executioner, and, at the same time, based on so-called "agency expertise," the courts will now 
dodge meaningful judicial review. Cf. Wlthrow v. Larkln, 421 U.S. 35, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 723-24, 95 
S.Ct. 1456 (1975). This case 1s a sterling example of the abuse attendant to giving a government 
agency the power to define morality and thereby destroy a person's livelihood. The problem is 
also not unique to state government. For example, The New Republic, a national opinion magazine, 
Issue 4,013, December 16, 1991, p. 9, 1n an art icle entitled ^'Uncivil Rites," criticizes the now 
accepted practice of wholeheartedly "deferring to agency expertise." Therein, the article stated 
in conclusion: "The upshot is that in conflicts with the new executive/judicial axis, Congress 
will lose one way on another." See Ex. "18" for a ful l copy of this art ic le . 
This Petition fulfills the considerations set forth in Rule 
46(a), (c) and (d). Based on the foregoing, this Court should 
take a long, hard look at what the Court of Appeals has done and 
the dangerous legacy such a misinformed and result-oriented 
decision necessarily leaves behind. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
DATED this 20th day of March, 1! 
1000.01A:cert.l-12(foot.10-11) 
Jdhn fl/cfia^l"Coombs 
Attorney for the Johnsons 
